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THE NEWSPERSON'S PRIVILEGE IN





More than a decade ago, the United States Supreme Court, in
Branzburg v. Hayes,' first recognized a qualified newsperson's privilege
based on the first amendment. Since Branzburg, federal and state courts
have decided scores of cases involving the newsperson's privilege.2 De-
spite its overwhelming acceptance among federal courts and among
many state courts, the nature and scope of the privilege remain unclear.3
Most of the confusion results from the courts' varying treatments of the
privilege in different contexts. Thus, the recognition and application of
the privilege frequently turns on whether the privilege arises in a civil
action, a defamation action, a criminal trial, or a grand jury proceed-
ing.4 This Comment will focus on the use of the newsperson's privilege
in grand jury proceedings.
Newsgatherers depend heavily on confidential sources to provide
newsworthy information. 5 Compelled disclosure of confidential sources
and confidential information injures the media by deterring potential
news sources, particularly those who desire to remain anonymous, from
1 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
2 See, e.g., Tofani v. State, 297 Md. 165, 465 A.2d 413 (1983), and cases cited therein.
3 See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983) (recognizing the first
amendment privilege in criminal trial proceedings); Riley v. Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir.
1979) (recognizing the first amendment privilege in civil trial proceedings); Tofani v. State,
297 Md. 165, 465 A.2d 413 (1983) (rejecting the first amendment privilege in grand jury
proceedings); Andrews v. Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d 410, 400 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (re-
jecting the first amendment privilege in grand jury proceedings),
4 See, e.g., Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976)
(recognizing the first amendment privilege in criminal trial proceedings); Lewis v. United
States, 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975) (rejecting the first amendment privilege in grand jury
proceedings).
5 Guest & Stanzler, The ConstitutionalArgumentfor Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw.
U.L. REV. 18, 57-61 (1969); Murasky, TheJournalist'r P'vilege: Branzburg andlt.s Aftrmath, 52
TEx. L. REV. 829, 858 (1974).
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divulging sensitive information to the news media. 6 The news media
experiences a chilling effect when a reporter testifies about confidential
sources. Not only does such testimony inhibit confidential sources from
talking to the media, but, because reporters also fear revealing their con-
fidential contacts, such testimony diminishes the zeal with which news-
persons investigate matters of acute public interest. 7 Forced disclosure
of newsperson's sources and information may contravene both the letter
and spirit of the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press.
The public ultimately shares the injury to the media. A democratic
system depends on a well-informed citizenry able to fulfill the responsi-
bilities and obligations of self-government.8 Because the news media is
the major source of the public's day-to-day information, the first amend-
ment freedom of the press provides the means by which the media is
able to keep the public well-informed. 9
The efficient and effective functioning of the grand jury is often at
odds with the newsperson's privilege. Historically, the law gave the
grand jury dual functions: to investigate and to accuse.' 0 As investiga-
tor, the grand jury uses subpoenas, grants of immunity, and contempt
orders to coerce witnesses to testify concerning criminal activity and
those perpetrating it." As accuser, the grand jury checks the prosecutor
by screening unfounded charges12 and returning indictments when
"probable cause" exists that the accused committed the crime
charged. 13 In federal cases, the fifth amendment guarantees the crimi-
nal defendant a right to an indictment by a grand jury. 14 Despite the
grand jury's powers to gather information, 15 however, including a long
standing right to "everyman's testimony,"' 6 the Constitution does not
guarantee the grand jury's ability to compel testimony to indict a crimi-
nal defendant. In many circumstances, therefore, a qualified constitu-
6 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)" id. at 736 (Stew-
art, J., dissenting); United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 355-56 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
7 The existence and extent of this chilling effect has been empirically confirmed. See
BLASI, PRESS SUBPOENAS: AN EMPIRICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1972).
8 See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ('debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"); see generaly A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM (1960).
9 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (newsgatherers
stand "as surrogates for the public").
10 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
11 Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919).
12 United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 629 (2d Cir. 1979).
13 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 686-87.
14 U.S.. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . .. .
15 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668.
16 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 345.
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tionally derived newsperson's privilege should allow reporters to refuse
to reveal confidential information in grand jury proceedings.
Courts have applied a balancing test when reporters assert a first
amendment privilege in criminal proceedings.' 7 In balancing criminal
defendants' sixth amendment right to obtain evidence in their favor
with a newsperson's qualified first amendment privilege, courts have
compelled a newsperson to reveal sources or confidential information
only upon the defendant's showing that (1) the information sought is
material and relevant; (2) alternative sources for obtaining the informa-
tion have been exhausted; and (3) the reporter's testimony is essential to
a fair resolution of the proceeding.' 8
This Comment will first argue that courts should use a similar bal-
ancing test when a reporter asserts the first amendment privilege in a
federal grand jury proceeding. Because a grand jury has no constitu-
tional right to a newsperson's testimony, no competing constitutional
interests exist when a reporter claims the newsperson's privilege. It is
inconsistent for courts to recognize a qualified first amendment privilege
in criminal proceedings, therefore, but deny the same qualified privilege
in grand jury proceedings.
This Comment will next argue that state "shield laws" do not pro-
vide a reporter's privilege in grand jury proceedings equivalent to the
first amendment qualified privilege. Twenty-six states have enacted
"shield laws" that allow newspersons to refuse to disclose information
obtained in the course of their newsgathering in any judicial, legislative,
or administrative proceeding, including grand jury proceedings. Such
statutory privileges, however, are almost never absolute. The vast ma-
jority of state shield laws provide a qualified statutory privilege that af-
fords less protection than the first amendment privilege. Consequently,
the existence of a statutory newsperson's privilege does not mitigate the
need to recognize a first amendment privilege in state grand jury
proceedings.
Finally, this Comment will show that a qualified first amendment
privilege extends to grand jury proceedings in states that have not en-
acted shield laws. Once shield law and non-shield law states recognize
the first amendment privilege, courts should apply the identical balanc-
ing test advocated for use in federal grand jury proceedings. Only in
states whose shield laws confer greater protection to reporters than the
17 See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Cuthbert-
son, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981); State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt.
266, 315 A.2d 254 (1974); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429, cert. denied,
419 U.S. 966 (1974).
18 See, e.g., United States v. Blanton, 534 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1982); United States v.
Hubbard, 493 F. Supp. 202 (D.D.C. 1979).
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qualified first amendment privilege is the suggested balancing test
unnecessary.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL NEWSPERSON'S
PRIVILEGE
In order for courts to recognize a newsperson's privilege in grand
jury proceedings, the privilege must be established either by common
law, by statute, or by the Constitution. At common law, courts histori-
cally did not recognize a testimonial privilege for newspersons in any
form. 19 Jealously guarding the common law rule requiring all persons
to testify, courts traditionally held that a grand jury's inquisitorial mis-
sion outweighed any interest of newspersons in maintaining the confi-
dentiality of their sources.20 Congress periodically has proposed, but
never enacted, federal legislation statutorily guaranteeing a newsper-
son's privilege. 2 ' Based on the watershed case of Branzburg v. Hayes,
courts in most federal jurisdictions have recognized a constitutionally
derived newsperson's privilege.22 Federal courts, however, have only in-
19 See Williams v. American Broadcasting Co., 96 F.R.D. 658 (W.D. Ark. 1983); 23 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5426 (1980).
Recently, however, several jurisdictions have recognized a newsperson's federal common law
privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1126 (1981); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. N.F.L., 89 F.R.D. 489, 492
(C.D. Cal. 1981); infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969); Brewster v. Boston
Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D.C. Mass. 1957); Exparte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48
P. 124 (1897); Joslyn v. People, 67 Colo. 297, 184 P. 375 (1919); Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117
(Fla. 1950); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911); In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L.
235, 85 A. 1011 (1913); People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936).
21 See, e.g., H.R. 6213, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. 172, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975);
S. 870, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 1311, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 3552, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970).
22 The District of Columbia Circuit, First Circuit, Second Circuit, Third Circuit, Fourth
Circuit, Fifth Circuit, Eighth Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and Tenth Circuit have recognized the
privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983) (privilege recognized in
criminal action); Zerelli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (privilege recognized in civil
action); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (Ist Cir. 1980) (privi-
lege recognized in libel action); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981) (privilege recognized in criminal action); Miller v. Trans-
american Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981) (privilege
recognized in libel action); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977) (privilege
recognized in civil action); United States v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976), af'd
en banc, 561 F.2d 539 (1977) (privilege recognized in civil action); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d
464 (9th Cir. 1975), cerl. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976) (privilege recognized in criminal action);
Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973) (privi-
lege recognized in libel action). In the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, the privilege has been
recognized at the district court level. See Gulliver's Periodicals, Ltd. v. Chas. Levy Cir. Co.,
455 F. Supp. 1197 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (privilege recognized in civil action); McArdle v. Hunter, 7
MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2294 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (privilege recognized in civil action). The
Eleventh Circuit has yet to confront the issue.
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frequently extended the privilege to grand jury proceedings.23
In Branzburg,24 a divided Supreme Court addressed, but did not
resolve, a qualified first amendment reporter's privilege. The case in-
volved a story about the illegal production of hashish written by Paul
Branzburg, a reporter for the Louisville Courier-journal. Branzburg per-
sonally witnessed the hashish production.25 Subpoenaed by a Kentucky
grand jury, Branzburg appeared before the grand jury but claimed a
first amendment reporter's privilege and refused to reveal whom he had
seen make the hashish.2 6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the
23 See United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983); Zerelli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972).
24 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The Supreme Court, in Branzburg, consolidated three cases involv-
ing reporters claiming a first amendment privilege to withhold information before a grand
jury. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub now. Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970), af'd sub noma.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971),
rev'd sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
In Caldwello. United States, the petitioner, Earl Caldwell, was a black reporter for the New
York Times covering activities of the Black Panther Party in California. He not only refused to
reveal confidential information before a grand jury, but also refused to attend the grand
jury's secret sessions, arguing that his mere appearance would harm his confidential relation-
ships and make it impossible for him to fulfill his first amendment responsibilities as a jour-
nalist. 434 F.2d at 1084. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted both arguments. The
court recognized Caldwell's qualified first amendment privilege and held that a grand jury
could not compel a reporter to appear before it when the government had proven no compel-
ling need for his testimony. Id. at 1089.
In In re Pappas, the petitioner, Paul Pappas, a reporter for a Providence, Rhode Island
television station, had been inside a Black Panthers' headquarters at the time of riots in New
Bedford, Massachusetts. A Bristol County grand jury twice subpoenaed Pappas; although he
appeared the first time, he moved to quash the second subpoena on the authority of the
district court's opinion in Caldwell. 358 Mass. at 606, 266 N.E.2d at 298. The Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts held that a reporter could not refuse to appear before a grand
jury and denied Pappas' motion to quash the subpoena. Id at 612, 266 N.E.2d at 302-03.
Justice White, in his plurality opinion in Branwburg, disposed of Pappas and Caldwell by
rejecting a reporter's first amendment privilege to refuse to answer questions asked by a grand
jury. Justice White concluded that afortioino privilege could exist to refuse to appear before
a grand jury. 408 U.S. at 708. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, agreed: "The news-
man witness, like all other witnesses, will have to appear; he will not be in a position to
litigate at the threshold the State's very authority to subpoena him." Id. at 710 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
25 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667-68.
26 Id. at 668. Branzburg and its companion cases were not the first to raise the issue of a
first amendment reporter's privilege. Fourteen years before Bratrburg, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized a constitutional testimonial privilege for
newsgatherers in Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
Sued for defamation, reporter Torre refused to reveal the identity of her source on first
amendment grounds. The court agreed that forced disclosure might unconstitutionally
abridge the freedom of the press. Id. at 548. Noting, however, that the plaintiff was seeking
limited disclosure of relevant and material information that went to the "heart of the plain-
tiffs claim," the court concluded that the need for the evidence outweighed the first amend-
ment interests of Ms. Torre. Id. at 550. Until Branzburg, few courts accepted the qualified first
amendment protection acknowledged in Torte. See In re Goodfader's Appeal, 45 Hawaii 317,
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issue of whether a reporter who had witnessed criminal activity could,
under a qualified first amendment privilege, refuse to testify before a
grand jury as to what he had seen. 27
Writing for a four-member plurality, Justice White rejected a first
amendment privilege for reporters. Although he acknowledged that
newsgathering may claim some first amendment protection,28 Justice
White concluded that the "First Amendment does not invalidate every
incidental burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement
of civil or criminal statutes of general applicability. '29 The plurality
held that a reporter cannot invoke a first amendment newsperson's priv-
ilege to withhold eyewitness testimony of a crime before a grand jury
even if that testimony would reveal the identity of the reporter's
source.
3 0
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
Justice Stewart argued that newsgatherers do have a qualified first
amendment testimonial privilege. 3 1 According to Justice Stewart, the
privilege can be defeated only upon a showing by the government that
(1) the information sought is clearly relevant to a specific probable vio-
lation of the law; (2) alternative sources for obtaining the information
have been exhausted; and (3) a compelling and overriding interest in the
information exists. 32 Justice Douglas, in a separate dissent, stated that
newsgatherers have an absolute privilege under the first amendment to
refuse to identify confidential sources and disclose any confidential in-
formation received therefrom.33
In a three-paragraph concurrence, Justice Powell explained his de-
ciding vote in the case. Agreeing with the plurality that reporters who
359, 367 P.2d 472, 480 (1961); State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 659, 183 N.W.2d 93, 99 (1971)
(plaintiff's need for reporter's confidential information outweighed reporter's first amendment
interests).
27 None of the parties in Branzburg, Caldwell, or Pappas argued for an absolute privilege.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 702. Each conceded that the qualified privilege could be overcome by
the state's demonstration that a compelling need for the information existed. Id
28 Id at 708. The first amendment protections Justice White discussed, however, applied
only to harassment by a grand jury or grand jury investigations conducted in bad faith:
"Grand juries are not subject to judicial control and subpoenas to motions to quash. We do
not expect courts will forget that grand juries must operate within the limits of the First
Amendment as well as the Fifth." Id.
29 Id at 682. The plurality accepted the argument that compelling reporters to aid the
grand jury in a criminal investigation would create a chilling effect on reporters' ability to
gather news. The plurality did not believe, however, that the chilling effect would be great.
"[T]he evidence fails to demonstrate that there would be significant constriction of the flow of
news to the public if this Court reaffirms the prior common-law and constitutional rule re-
garding the testimonial obligations of newsmen." Id. at 693.
30 Id. at 692.
31 Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
32 Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
33 I at 722 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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witness a crime may be compelled to testify before a grand jury as to
whom and what they saw, Justice Powell nevertheless argued that re-
porters are "not without constitutional rights with respect to the gather-
ing of news or in safeguarding their sources."'34 Justice Powell proposed
a case-by-case reviewing process whereby courts would balance the
newsperson's privilege against the obligation of all citizens to testify
about alleged criminal conduct. 35 Thus, the Branzburg dissenters to-
gether with Justice Powell's swing concurrence formed a five-vote ma-
jority recognizing a qualified first amendment newsperson's privilege.36
After Branzburg, federal courts have recognized a newsperson's qual-
ified first amendment privilege in all judicial proceedings except grand
jury proceedings.37 Largely because no competing constitutional rights
are involved, courts have given the privilege greatest effect in civil ac-
tions in which the media is not a party.38 Most courts have followed
34 Id at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
35 Id. Justice Powell did not clearly articulate his balancing scheme. See Goodale,
Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualisfed Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709,
717-18 (1975) (concluding that little, if any, conflict exists between Justice Powell's concur-
rence and Justice Stewart's dissent).
36 Justice Powell subsequently amplified his Branzburg opinion in Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974). Underscoring that his concurrence with the Branzburg plurality
was limited to the narrow facts of the case, Justice Powell observed that "a fair reading of the
majority's analysis in Branzburg makes plain that the result hinged on an assessment of the
competing societal interests involved in that case rather than on any determination that First
Amendment freedoms were not implicated." Id. at 859-60 (Powell, J., dissenting).
37 Scesupra note 22. The overwhelming majority of academic commentaries likewise have
construed Branzburg to recognize a qualified first amendment privilege. See, e.g., Goodale, supra
note 35, at 717-18; Murasky, The Journalist's Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 TEx. L.
REV. 829, 858 (1974); Sgnificant Development, Constitutional Law-The Newsman's Privilege, 53
B.U.L. REv. 497 (1973); The Supreme Court, 1971 Tenn, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1137 (1972); Com-
ment, The Fallacy ofFarber: Failure to Acknowledge the Constitutional Newsman's Privilege in Criminal
Cases, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 299 (1979); Comment, The Right ofthe Press to Gather
Information After Branzburg andPell, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 166 (1975). But see Yarbrough, Press
Privilege Claim and Balancing Doctrine, 31 ALA. L. REV. 523 (1980) (construing Branzburg to
reject any first amendment reporter's privilege).
38 See, e.g., McGraw Hill v. Arizona, 680 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1982) (multidistrict litigation
brought against seventeen oil companies alleging Sherman Act violation); Zerelli v. Smith,
656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (action against U.S. Attorney General alleging illegal electronic
surveillance); Riley v. Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 action by may-
oral candidate alleging civil rights violations); United States v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373
(4th Cir. 1976), aJ'den bane, 561 F.2d 539 (1977) (contempt trial of union members charged
with violating restraining order); Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973) (class action alleging discriminatory real estate practices); Los
Angeles Coliseum Comm'n v. N.F.L., 89 F.R.D. 489 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (federal antitrust and
state tort claims arising from transfer of Oakland Raiders to Los Angeles); Montezuma Re-
alty Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 494 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (private class
action alleging violation of federal securities laws); Altemose Constr. Co. v. Building and
Constr. Trades Council, 443 F. Supp. 489 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (federal civil action); Democratic
Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973) (action arising from Watergate
break-in of Democratic National Headquarters).
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Justice Stewart's approach in Branzburg and required a showing of mate-
riality, exhaustion of alternative sources, and necessity by the party re-
questing the information. 39  In defamation cases in which the
newsperson is a defendant, most courts have applied the Stewart balanc-
ing test, but often rule that the identity of the defendant's confidential
sources is so critical to the plaintiff's claim that the privilege must
yield. 40
More complex are criminal cases in which defendants attempt to
subpoena information in the possession of the press by contending that
the information sought is necessary for their defense. In such cases, the
defendant's sixth amendment right to compulsory process, which in-
cludes the right to exculpatory evidence, 41 collides with a reporter's first
amendment privilege to protect confidential sources and information.
Most federal courts have granted the newsgatherer a qualified first
amendment privilege to refuse disclosure of the information. 42
The qualified first amendment privilege will be upheld in criminal
trial proceedings unless the defendant successfully meets the Stewart
balancing test. 43 In United States v. Burke,44 for example, a grand jury
indicted the defendant on a point-shaving charge. The defendant, in an
attempt to impeach the testimony of the prosecutor's chief witness, re-
39 See supra note 38.
40 See, e.g., Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974);
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976).
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (de-
clining to extend first amendment protection to the "editorial process" of a media defendant
in a defamation action), a few courts veered sharply from the Stewart balancing test. These
courts subsumed "confidential sources" within "editorial process," and interpreted the Lando
Court's rejection of a privilege protecting editorial processes as an implicit rejection of a privi-
lege for confidential sources. See, e.g., DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 507 F. Supp. 880 (D. Hawaii
1981). A second line of cases held that a court could not compel a media defendant to dis-
close a source, but, as a consequence, the media defendant could not rely on the source's
existence to contest actual malice. See, e.g., Mazzella v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 479 F.
Supp. 523 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). Other courts continued to require that the plaintiff's case be non-
frivolous, the journalists' information be highly relevant, and the plaintiff must exhaust alter-
native sources before the privilege will fall. See, e.g., Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspa-
per Co., 633 F.2d 583 (lst Cir. 1980); Miller v. Transamerica Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Dowd v. Calabrese, 577 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C.
1983); Travoulareas v. Piro, 93 F.R.D. 11 (D.D.C. 1981); Mize v. McGraw Hill, Inc., 86
F.R.D. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
41 The sixth amendment states: "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .... ." U.S.
CONsT. amend. VI. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); Note, Sixth Amendment Limi-
tations on the Newsperson's Privilege, 13 RUTGERs L.J. 361, 378-84 (1982).
42 See, e.g., Tofani v. State, 297 Md. 165, 465 A.2d 413 (1983).
43 See infra text accompanying notes 44-55. See also United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346
(3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); United States v. Orsini, 424 F. Supp. 229
(E.D.N.Y. 1976), afd mem., 559 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977).
44 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983).
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quested the trial court to subpoena the unpublished notes and drafts of
a Sports Illustrated reporter who had interviewed the witness.45 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit quashed the subpoena, noting
that a court may order newsgatherers to disclose their sources only when
the information is (1) highly material and relevant; (2) necessary or criti-
cal to the maintenance of the claim; and (3) not obtainable from other
available sources. 46 The Second Circuit agreed with the trial court that
the defendant had not met his burden.4 7 Further, the Second Circuit
found "no legally-principled reason for drawing a distinction between
civil and criminal cases when considering whether the reporter's interest
in confidentiality should yield to the moving party's need for probative
evidence." 4
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has applied a similar balanc-
ing scheme. In United States v. Cuthbertson,49 a grand jury indicted the
defendants on counts of criminal conspiracy and fraudulent fast food
franchising. The trial court subpoenaed CBS News, demanding out-
takes and documents of a "Sixty Minutes" segment entitled "From
Burgers to Bankruptcy" that focused on the defendants' operations.50
The defendants claimed that the "Sixty Minutes" segment contained
unspecified exculpatory information and potentially inconsistent state-
ments that the defendants could use to impeach government witnesses.5 '
CBS, citing its first amendment privilege, refused to produce the materi-
als and was judged in contempt.5 2 On appeal, the Third Circuit re-
versed the trial court's decision, holding that journalists possess a
45 Id at 76.
46 Id at 77.
47 Id at 78. Balancing the defendant's sixth amendment right to "the broadest possible
opportunity to cross examine [adverse] witnesses" against the reporter's qualified first amend-
ment privilege "to maintain the integrity of its news gathering and editorial functions," id at
76, the trial court had noted that the defendant already possessed "a substantial arsenal of
impeachment material" including grand jury testimony, interviews with government agents,
and material relating to the witness' prior criminal convictions and plea bargaining agree-
ments. Id
48 d. The court further stated:
To be sure, a criminal defendant has more at stake than a civil litigant and the eviden-
tiary needs of a criminal defendant may weigh more heavily in the balance. Nevertheless,
the standard of review should remain the same. Indeed, the important societal interests
in the free flow of information that are protected by the reporter's qualified privilege are
particularly compelling in criminal cases. Reporters are to be encouraged to investigate
and expose, free from unnecessary government intrusion, evidence of criminal
wrongdoing.
Id. at 77. See aso, United States v. Orsini, 424 F. Supp. 229 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), af'dmem., 559
F.2d 1206 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977) (criminal defendant's subpoena of re-
porter's confidential information quashed on first amendment grounds for lack of relevance).
49 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981).
50 Id at 142.




qualified constitutional privilege not to divulge confidential sources or
to disclose unpublished information in criminal cases. 53 Distinguishing
potential exculpatory information from information that is potentially
valuable for impeachment purposes, the court, after hearing a second
interlocutory appeal, ruled that as to the former, the defendants had
failed to exhaust alternative sources as required by the reporter's privi-
lege.54 The court stated that it would allow the subpoena of informa-
tion valuable for impeachment only after the witnesses had testified. 55
Because a press that is at all times compelled to reveal confidential
sources and information to criminal defendants is less likely to pursue
stories involving criminal wrongdoing, many criminals will remain un-
detected and unpunished.5 6 Consequently, a criminal defendant's sixth
amendment right to compulsory process may not overcome, in every
instance, a reporter's qualified first amendment privilege. 57 Constitu-
tional rights are often not absolute.58 When conflicts arise between two
constitutionally based claims, courts attempt to resolve the conflict by
53 Id. at 147. The court reasoned that:
A defendant's sixth amendment and due process rights certainly are not irrelevant when
a journalist's privilege is asserted. But rather than affecting the existence of the qualified
privilege, we think that these rights are important factors that must be considered in
deciding whether, in the circumstances of an individual case, the privilege must yield to
the defendant's need for the information.
Id.
The Cuthbertson court also found a qualified newsperson's privilege on the basis of federal
common law. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
54 United States v. Cuthbertson II, 651 F.2d 189, 194, cer. denied, 454 U.S. 1056 (1981).
55 Id. at 196. Other federal courts have recognized the first amendment privilege in crimi-
nal trial proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Blanton, 534 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1982)
(reporter's privilege includes sources and unpublished information); United States v. Hub-
bard, 493 F. Supp. 202 (D.D.C. 1979) (reporter's privilege includes sources and unpublished
information); United States v. Orsini, 424 F. Supp. 229 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), afdmn., 559 F.2d
1206 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977) (reporter's privilege includes sources only). But
see New York Times v. Jascalevich, 349 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1978) (White, J., in chambers)
("[T]here is no present authority in this Court that a newsman need not produce documents
material to the prosecution or defense of a criminal case. . . or that the obligation to obey an
otherwise valid subpoena served on a newsman is conditioned upon the showing of special
circumstances").
56 See, e.g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1126 (1981) (reporters uncover fast food franchising fraud); United States v. Blanton, 534 F.
Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (reporter uncovers illegal distribution of controlled substance);
Hammarley v. Super. Ct., 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979) (reporter reveals
assailants in California homicide); State v. Siel, 122 N.H. 254, 444 A.2d 499 (1982) (reporters
uncover drug-related activity of homicide victim).
57 See, e.g., United States v. Hubbard, 493 F. Supp. 202 (D.D.C. 1979) (criminal defend-
ant's subpoena of reporter's research material quashed).
58 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (first amendment rights of press not abso-
lute); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (first amendment rights of press not absolute); Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (fourteenth amendment right of equal protection
not absolute).
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means of a balancing test.5 9 The United States Supreme Court has
stated:
The authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign priorities
as between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights, ranking one as
superior to the other. . . . [I]f the authors of these guarantees, fully aware
of the potential conflicts between them, were unwilling or unable to resolve
the issue by assigning to one priority over the other, it is not for us to
rewrite the Constitution by undertaking what they declined to do.60
The right of a criminal defendant to subpoena exculpatory evi-
dence is fundamental to insuring a fair trial. At the same time, reporters
should be free to investigate and expose evidence of criminal wrongdo-
ing without unnecessary intrusion. Indeed, the societal interests that jus-
tify the newsperson's privilege-the maintenance of a vigorous,
aggressive, and independent press capable of participating in robust, un-
fettered debate6 1-are particularly compelling in criminal cases.
III. APPLYING THE NEWSPERSON'S PRIVILEGE TO GRAND JURY
PROCEEDINGS
A citizen's duty to testify before a grand jury is a fundamental obli-
gation difficult to overcome. 62 The Supreme Court has held that the
59 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (mother's fourteenth amendment right to
privacy versus fetus's fourteenth amendment right to life); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333 (1966) (first amendment right of press to cover trial versus criminal defendant's four-
teenth amendment right to fair trial).
60 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976).
61 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
62 Historians have traced the origins of the grand jury back to 12th century England.
Although originally established by the Crown as a counterforce to the ecclesiastical courts
and as an additional means for tax collection, the grand jury evolved into a quasi-independ-
ent citizens panel to provide a fair method for instituting criminal proceedings against crimi-
nal suspects. Historically, the grand jury acted both as a "sword" and a "shield." Given the
power to subpoena and grant immunity, the grand jury investigates criminal activity and,
upon a threshold finding of "probable cause," indicts those persons perpetrating it. A grand
jury may, however, refuse to indict if it believes the prosecutor's attempt to bring criminal
charges is unfounded.
The founding fathers, sensitive to the potential for politically motivated prosecutions,
insured the continued existence of the grand jury by giving it constitutional sanction in the
Bill of Rights. The grand jury is thus the sole method for bringing federal charges in serious
criminal cases. The grand jury's continued constitutional status underscores the belief that
the power to prosecute is susceptible to abuse if left to the unbridled discretion of the prosecu-
tors. See generally M. FRANKEL & G. NAI-TALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUTION ON
TRIAL (1977).
A grand jury's ability to pursue its mission is unhampered by rigid procedural or eviden-
tial rules. Its investigative powers are broad, and the scope of its inquiry is neither predeter-
mined nor predirected. Over the years, the law has strengthened and even expanded the
grand jury's vast inquisitorial powers. For example, a grand jury may base an indictment
solely on hearsay evidence. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956). A grand jury can
subpoena any party within its jurisdiction upon short notice and without prior justification of
its need for the evidence. See Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919). The grand jury
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public's right to "everyman's testimony" 6 3 is "particularly applicable to
grand jury proceedings. ' 64 The power of the grand jury to compel tes-
timony, however, is limited: "A grand jury may not violate a valid priv-
ilege, whether established by the Constitution, statutes, or the common
law."'65 Likewise, grand jury proceedings may not compromise a wit-
ness' constitutional rights and protections. A grand jury cannot require
witnesses to testify against themselves in violation of the fifth amend-
can conduct "fishing expeditions" to detect possible criminal activity without first establish-
ing the likelihood that any offense has been committed. See id.; Hendricks v. United States,
223 U.S. 178, 184 (1911). The grand jury also can compel witnesses' testimony by granting
immunity and using the court's contempt power to force compliance with the immunity or-
der. See Kastigor v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448 (1972). If witnesses persist in their
silence, a court may hold them in contempt and imprison them. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1826
(1976).
The limited rights of grand jury witnesses further enhance the grand jury's extraordinary
powers. In many jurisdictions, grand jury witnesses have no right to prior notice of the sub-
ject matter under investigation, Blair, 250 U.S. at 282-83; no right to be told whether they are
the target of the investigation, United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977); no absolute
right to be informed of their privilege against self-incrimination, Lawn v. United States, 355
U.S. 339 (1958); no right to refuse to answer questions based on evidence obtained in an
unlawful search and seizure, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); no right to
counsel's assistance in the grand jury room, see In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 335 (1957); and no
right to have their testimony recorded, see Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1026 (5th ed. 1980), and sources cited therein.
Courts tolerate weak or erroneous grand jury indictments because the indictee still is
entitled at trial to a strict observance of all the rules designed to bring about a fair verdict.
Requiring the observance of evidentiary rules "would saddle the grand jury process with
mini-trials and preliminary showings [that] would assuredly impede its investigation and frus-
trate the public's interest in the fair and expeditious administration of the criminal laws."
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). See generally L. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY:
THE USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL POWER (1975); Arenella, Reforming the State GrandJuly
System, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 2 (1981); Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand
Jug, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 701 (1972).
Despite its formidable powers, the grand jury is almost always dependent on the prosecu-
tor for information, advice, and direction. Grand jurors frequently do not understand their
rights and responsibilities. With no judicial oversight, the prosecutor, acting through the
grand jury, is able to wield the extraordinary powers reserved for the grand jury alone. In-
deed, most commentators agree that the modern investigating grand jury is no more than an
arm of the prosecution. See generally L. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY: THE USE AND ABUSE OF
POLITICAL POWER (1975); M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITU-
TION ON TRIAL (1977); Arenella, Reforming the State GrandJugy System, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 2
(1981); Geratein & Robinson, Remedy for the GrandJugy: Retain but Reform, 69 A.B.A. J. 337
(1978); McGoughey, Trials of a GrandJuror, 65 A.B.A. J. 725 (1979).
63 United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
64 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 668 (1972). In United States v. Calandra, the Court
stated that:
The duty to testify may on occasion be burdensome and even embarassing. It may
cause injury to a witness' social and economic status. Yet the duty to testify has been
regarded as "so necessary to the administration of justice" that the witness' personal
interest in privacy must yield to the public's overriding interest in full disclosure.
414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974).
65 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 346. In Calandra, the Court held that the fourth amendment ex-
clusionary rule does not apply to grand jury proceedings.
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ment guarantee against self-incrimination. 66 The fourth amendment
also protects legitimate privacy interests from grand jury invasion. A
grand jury's subpoena duces tecum, 6 7 for instance, is invalid if it is "far
too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as reasonable" under the fourth
amendment.6 8
Grand jury proceedings do not command the same constitutional
imperatives as criminal trials. The fifth amendment requires a grand
jury indictment as a condition precedent to a federal criminal trial.6 9
The right to have a jury of one's peers consider the evidence before the
commencement of a criminal prosecution belongs to the criminal sus-
pect. 70 Oin the other hand, the fifth amendment does not give the grand
jury the right to compel testimony. The efficient and effective operation
of the grand jury, including broad investigatory powers and the judi-
cially sanctioned right to everyman's testimony, although important, is
not guaranteed, therefore, by the constitution.
A criminal defendant's need for exculpatory information is weight-
ier than the government's interest in prosecuting crime because the for-
mer, through the sixth amendment, is constitutionally protected and the
latter is not.7i Yet, despite the constitutional guarantee of compulsory
process, a criminal defendant's attempt to compel disclosure of confi-
dential information from a newsgatherer does not automatically suc-
ceed. Courts routinely apply the Stewart balancing test when a reporter
asserts a first amendment privilege in criminal proceedings, and fre-
quently deny a criminal defendant's request for a reporter's confidential
information when the defendant is unable to demonstrate that the de-
sired information is necessary, material, and unavailable from an alter-
native source. 72 At the same time, courts routinely refuse to extend the
first amendment privilege to grand jury proceedings even though the
grand jury's ability to force disclosure of a reporter's testimony,
although at times compelling, is not constitutionally guaranteed.
73
66 Id Similarly, a grand jury cannot require witnesses to produce private books and
records that would incriminate them. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-35 (1886).
67 A subpoena duces tecum requires production of books, papers, and other things.
BLACK's LAW DIarIONARY 1279 (5th ed. 1979).
68 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).
69 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
70 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343.
71 See supra note 41.
72 See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Hubbard,
493 F. Supp. 202 (D.D.C. 1979); United States v. Orsini, 424 F. Supp. 229 (E.D.N.Y. 1976),
affdmem., 559 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977); Hammarley v. Super. Ct.,
89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979); State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254
(1974); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966
(1974).
73 See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975); Tofani v. State, 297 Md.
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Courts have recognized that the interest of criminal defendants in
securing relevant information for their trials is greater than the prosecu-
tor's interest in investigating criminal activity through a grand jury. 74 If
courts recognize and weigh a qualified first amendment privilege when
a competing constitutional interest is at stake, aforliori courts should rec-
ognize and weigh the privilege when no competing constitutional inter-
est exists. Thus, the refusal to extend the reporter's privilege to grand
jury proceedings while simultaneously recognizing the privilege in crim-
inal trial proceedings is at best anomalous, at worst constitutionally
inconsistent.7 5
165, 465 A.2d 413 (1983); Andrews v. Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d 410, 400 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct.
1977).
74 For example, in United States v. Liddy, a District of Columbia district court observed that
"while the public has a crucial interest in the investigation and punishment of criminal activ-
ity, it must have an even deeper interest in assuring that a defendant receives a fair trial."
354 F. Supp. 208, 215 (D.D.C. 1972). Because the Liddy court interpreted Branzburg as re-
jecting a first amendment privilege in grand jury proceedings, the court rejected afortiori a
first amendment privilege in criminal trial proceedings. Similarly, in Brown v. Commonwealth,
the Virginia Supreme Court stressed that "[t]he Sixth Amendment rights of a citizen accused
of a crime. . . to 'call for evidence in his favor' are rights of no less dignity than the right to
the government to prosecute." 214 Va. 755, 757, 264 S.E.2d 429, 431, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966
(1974).
75 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the only federal circuit that has directly con-
fronted the claim of a first amendment privilege in grand jury proceedings, illustrates this
inconsistency. In Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975), the general manager
of a Los Angeles radio station refused to comply with a federal grand jury subpoena for
production of an original "communique" from the Symbionese Liberation Army. The trial
court held Lewis in civil contempt and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that under
Branzburg "the first amendment does not afford a reporter a privilege to refuse to testify before
a federal grand jury as to information received in confidence." Id. at 238.
The Lewis panel, curiously, ignored their colleague's holding in Bursey v. United States,
466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972), that the first amendment privilege extended to grand jury
proceedings. Bursey involved a grand jury subpoena of two reporters from Black Panther news-
paper. The reporters appeared before the grand jury but refused to answer questions relating
to information received in confidence or relating to the management of the paper. The Ninth
Circuit held that the government could overcome the reporter's first amendment privilege
only upon a showing of relevance, compelling need, and exhaustion of alternative sources.
The Bursy court went on to point out that:
When the collision occurs in the context of a grand jury investigation, the Govern-
ment's burden is not met unless it establishes that the Government's interest in the sub-
ject matter of the investigation is "immediate, substantial, and subordinating," that
there is a "substantial connection" between the information it seeks to have the witness
compelled to supply and the overriding governmental interest in the subject matter of
the investigation, and that the means of obtaining information is not more drastic than
necessary to forward the asserted governmental interest.
Bursey, 466 F.2d at 1083.
Because the Burs court released the case the day following the Branzburg decision, and
thus probably wrote the opinion before Branzhurg, the government moved for a rehearing on
the ground that the Bursey holding was inconsistent with Branzburg. The court denied the
motion, noting that nothing in its holding would permit "a grand jury witness to refuse on
First Amendment grounds to identify a person whom he has seen committing a crime." Id. at
1090-91. The court concluded:
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Courts have interpreted Branzburg to preclude the use of the news-
person's privilege in grand jury proceedings for a number of reasons.
The primary reason is that courts have misapplied Branzburg's narrow
holding. In Branzburg, the Supreme Court made clear that reporters
who observe a crime must testify before a grand jury as to whom and
what they saw. 76 Courts, however, have overextrapolated this holding
and refused to extend a qualified first amendment privilege to grand
jury proceedings when reporters receive confidential information about,
but do not personally witness, a crime. Branzburg does not stand for the
proposition that the first amendment privilege does not apply to any
grand jury proceeding; a majority of the justices in Branzburg recognized
that the privilege may extend to grand jury proceedings. 77
A second argument is that some courts might distinguish grand
jury from criminal proceedings because, unlike criminal proceedings,
grand juries operate in secret and do not adjudicate guilt or innocence.
Because of the secrecy of grand jury proceedings, therefore, reporters'
testimony before a grand jury does not compromise their sources. 78 The
We have reexamined our analysis of the factors involved in balancing the First
Amendment rights against the governmental interests asserted to justify compelling an-
swers to the questions here involved, and we have concluded that the balance we struck
is not impaired by Branzburg.
Id. at 1091.
Four months later, in Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S.
912 (1976), the Ninth Circuit recognized the first amendment privilege in criminal trial pro-
ceedings. Farr, a reporter for the Los Angeles Herald Examiner, covered the Charles Manson
trial. He obtained and published a description of a witness' confidential statement from a
party subject to a gag order. After the verdict, the trial judge attempted to uncover the
identity of the individuals violating the gag order by ordering Farr to appear before him and
reveal his confidential sources. Id. at 466. Farr refused on first amendment grounds and was
held in contempt. Id.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the contempt citation, but nevertheless interpreted Branwburg
to recognize a first amendment privilege in civil and criminal proceedings. Id The court
stated that the "First Amendment privilege and the opposing need for disclosure [should] be
judicially weighed in light of the surrounding facts and a balance struck to determine where
lies the paramount interest." Id. Without further defining the balancing test, the court ruled
that in order to guarantee a fair trial, the newsperson's privilege must yield to the more
important and compelling need for disclosure.
76 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 692 (1972). Even though invited to a crime by a
third-party "source," reporters who actually witness the crime themselves become sources of
information. Reporters, therefore, are not privileged to refuse to reveal the identities of those
they personally observe committing crimes. In re Ziegler, 550 F. Supp. 530 (W.D.N.Y. 1982);
Pankratz v. Colorado District Court, 609 P.2d 1101 (Colo. 1980); People v. Dan, 41 A.D.2d
687, 342 N.Y.S.2d 731, appeal dimissed, 34 N.Y.2d 764, 344 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1973). Assertion of
the privilege in this relatively uncommon situation, where the reporter is an information
source, is in contrast to the assertion of the privilege to protect sources who relate information
to a reporter who has no first-hand knowledge of the crime.
77 See supra text accompanying notes 24-36.
78 In his Branzburg plurality opinion, Justice White made a similar argument:
Moreover, grand juries characteristically conduct secret proceedings, and law en-
forcement officers are themselves experienced in dealing with informers, and have their
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secrecy argument fails, however, because a reporter's disclosures before a
grand jury are not a secret to the prosecutor or the government.7 9 No
evidence exists that newsgatherers believe that disclosure of confidential
information before a grand jury is less damaging than disclosures of con-
fidential information in other judicial proceedings.
Another reason against extending the qualified first amendment
privilege to grand jury proceedings is the existence of a federal common
law newsperson's privilege. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has re-
cently recognized such a federal common law privilege and applied it to
grand jury proceedings.8 0 As interpreted by the Third Circuit, the fed-
own methods for protecting them without interference with the effective administration
ofjustice. There is little before us indicating that informants whose interest in avoiding
exposure is that it may threaten job security, personal safety, or peace of mind, would, in
fact be in a worse position, or would think they would be, if they risked placing their
trust in public officials as well as reporters. We doubt if the informer who prefers ano-
nymity but is sincerely interested in furnishing evidence of crime will always or yery
often be deterred by the prospect of dealing with those public authorities characteristi-
cally charged with the duty to protect the public interest as well as his.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 695.
79 In Bursey v. United States, the Ninth Circuit pointed out:
The secrecy of the grand jury proceedings did little to soften the blow to the First
Amendment rights. The public did not know what the grand jury learned, but the pro-
ceedings were no secret to the Government. A Government lawyer initiated the investi-
gation. A Government lawyer presented the evidence to the grand jury. Political
dissidents who criticize the Government may well have more to fear about disclosure to
the Government than to anyone else, and the Government heard every word.
466 F.2d at 1086.
80 United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126
(1981); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979). This second ground for recogni-
tion is a relatively recent development. Scholars universally concede that no journalist's privi-
lege existed at common law. See C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5426 (1980); see also Williams v. American Broadcasting Co., 96
F.R.D. 658 (W.D. Ark. 1983).
Notwithstanding this lack of precedent, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979) (recognizing reporter's privilege in a
federal civil rights action), concluded that reporters have a federal common law privilege to
refuse to divulge information collected in the process of newsgathering. The Rilk court based
this conclusion on Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides in part that
"[e]xcept as otherwise required. . . the privilege of a witness. . . shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
light of reason and experience." FED. R. EvID. 501. The Rile court reasoned:
The legislative history of Rule 501 manifests that its flexible language was designed to
encompass, inter alia, a reporter's privilege not to disclose a source. The original draft of
the rule defined nine specific non-constitutional privileges, but failed to include among
the enumerated privileges one for a reporter or journalist. The Advisory Committee
gave no reason for the omission. This was one of the primary focuses of the congressional
review of the proposed evidentiary rules, stemming in part from the "nationwide discus-
sions of the newspaperman's privilege." Following testimony on behalf of groups such as
the Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press, the privilege rule was revised to
eliminate the proposed specific rules on privileges and to leave the law of privilege in its
current state to be developed by the federal courts.
612 F.2d at 714 (emphasis in original). Because the proposed rule did not include the news-
person's privilege in its original list of privileges and because the draftsmen later deleted the
1984] NEWSPERSON'S PRIVILEGE
eral common law privilege confers protection identical to the constitu-
tional privilege. Although the creation of a federal common law
privilege circumvents the need to interpret and apply the Branzburg deci-
sion, only one federal district court outside the Third Circuit has recog-
nized a similar common law privilege. 81 The federal common law
privilege's most fatal shortcoming, however, is that it does not apply to
the states.
A final argument against extending the qualified first amendment
privilege to grand jury proceedings is the existence of a federal adminis-
trative newsperson's privilege. 82 The federal administrative newsper-
son's privilege is inadequate because it is no more than guidelines issued
by the United States Attorney General regulating federal prosecutors'
power to issue subpoenas to the media. 83 The privilege does not have
the force of law.84 The Attorney General may excuse a federal prosecu-
tor from complying with the guidelines or rescind the requirements at
any time.8 5 The guidelines are not, of course, binding on state
prosecutors.
A small number of federal courts have recognized the need to ex-
enumerated privileges, the Third Circuit inferred that Congress' ultimate desire was for the
courts to develop such a privilege.
The federal common law privilege may be overcome upon a showing of relevance, neces-
sity, and exhaustion of alternative sources-in short, upon satisfaction of Justice Stewart's
test. Thus, the Third Circuit has interpreted the common law privilege to provide protection
identical to that of the first amendment privilege. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 143.
81 Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. N.F.L., 89 F.R.D. 489 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
82 The Branzburg decision resulted in the creation of an administrative reporter's privilege
covering federal government subpoenas. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1979). In 1973, the United
States Attorney General issued guidelines regulating the government's power to issue subpoe-
nas to the media, as well as to interrogate, arrest, or indict reporters. These guidelines apply
to both criminal trials and grand jury proceedings. The guidelines bear a striking similarity
to Justice Stewart's three-part balancing test. Federal prosecutors can subpoena members of
the media only if the desired information is not obtainable through alternative sources or
investigative steps. Id. Federal prosecutors can subpoena members of the media only in crim-
inal cases, and then only if the government has independent reason to believe that the infor-
mation sought is essential to the successful investigation or prosecution of a crime. Id.
The guidelines instruct government lawyers to attempt to accommodate the media's in-
terest by negotiating with newsgatherers when a subpoena is contemplated. Absent exigent
circumstances, government lawyers are not to question, arrest, or indict reporters for offenses
arising out of reporter's newsgathering activities without the Attorney General's prior con-
sent. Id
83 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1979).
84 Although the guidelines do not have the force of law, courts occasionally take cogni-
zance of the guideline requirements. See Maurice v. NLRB, 691 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1982)
(quashing NLRB subpoena for failure to comply with administrative guidelines); Lewis v.
United States, 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975) (refusing to overturn contempt citation in part
because administrative guidelines were followed); United States v. Blanton, 534 F. Supp. 295
(S.D. Fla. 1982) (quashing subpoena of reporter in part because federal prosecutor did not
comply with guideline requirements of exhaustion of sources and good faith negotiation).
85 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1979).
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tend the qualified first amendment privilege to grand jury proceedings.
In United States v. Burke, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals admitted
the need "to balance first amendment values even where a reporter is
asked to testify before a grand jury. '8 6 Similarly, in Zereili v. Smith, the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia concluded that "a
qualified privilege would be available in some circumstances even where
a reporter is called before a grand jury to testify. '8 7 Neither Burke nor
Zerelli, however, were grand jury cases. The courts' recognition of a con-
stitutional privilege in grand jury proceedings, therefore, has only the
force of dicta.88
Constitutional rights and protections afforded a witness are not
subject to compromise in grand jury proceedings. Courts should recog-
nize the current inconsistency involving the first amendment newsper-
son's privilege, and, by extending the privilege to grand jury
proceedings, resolve this inconsistency.
The first amendment privilege is, however, a qualified privilege. 89
Thus, courts must formulate a balancing test to weigh the privilege
when a reporter asserts the privilege in grand jury proceedings.
IV. THE BALANCING TEST
The first amendment privilege recognized by the Branzburg Court
and, subsequently, by lower courts in civil and criminal proceedings, is a
qualified privilege.9 Thus, courts have adopted the Stewart balancing
test to weigh the privilege against the competing interests involved.9'
86 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1983).
87 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
88 In In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1418 (D. Colo. 1982), a federal
court seemingly did extend the privilege to grand jury proceedings. A federal grand jury was
investigating charges that a secret service agent improperly removed pictures of John Hinck-
ley, Jr. during a search of Hinckley's parents' home. Id United Press International allegedly
obtained the pictures, and the government subpoenaed a UPI employee to testify. Id. The
court granted a motion to quash the subpoena after weighing the employee's first amendment
rights against the government's interest in pursuing a criminal investigation. Id. at 1420.
89 See, e.g., Zereli, 656 F.2d at 711; United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981).
90 Courts have uniformly recognized that the newsperson's privilege, like other first
amendment rights, is not an absolute, but a qualified right. SeeTofani v. State, 297 Md. 165,
465 A.2d 413 (1983), and cases cited therein. Justice Douglas is the only member of the
Supreme Court who has argued that nothing short of an absolute privilege for reporters will
satisfy the first amendment. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
91 See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983) (Stewart test applied in
criminal proceeding); Zerelli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Stewart test applied in
civil action); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981) (Stewart test applied in libel action); Riley v. City of Chester,
612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979) (Stewart test applied in civil action); United States v. Blanton,
534 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (Stewart test applied in criminal proceeding).
NEWSPERSON'S PRIVILEGE
Because the privilege in grand jury proceedings also will be a qualified
privilege, courts will require a balancing test to weigh the privilege
against the competing interests of the grand jury. Justice Stewart's bal-
ancing test is the best test to apply in grand jury proceedings. The Stew-
art test, requiring a three-fold showing of relevance, exhaustion of
alternative sources, and necessity, equitably balances the rights of both
the reporter and the grand jury.
The initial inquiry into the materiality of the privileged informa-
tion insures that before a grand jury can compel a newsperson to reveal
confidential information, the grand jury must establish that the infor-
mation is relevant to an investigation of a probable criminal violation.
Although grand juries have broad powers of investigation, 92 an inquiry
into the materiality of the information sought does not deny grand juries
the opportunity to investigate and detect criminal misconduct. Because
the reporter's privilege is a constitutionally protected interest, the mate-
riality requirement merely insures that interference with the privilege is
related to an investigation into real, rather than imaginary, criminal
wrongdoing. Thus, the materiality requirement provides a useful
threshold for a grand jury to cross before a court will consider further
the grand jury's challenge to the newsperson's privilege.
Second, the grand jury must exhaust alternative sources of the de-
sired information before subpoenaing a reporter. Like the materiality
requirement, the exhaustion requirement will not significantly hinder
grand jury investigations. Individuals who actually participate in or
witness an alleged crime will often be better sources of information than
reporters. In other cases, the testimony of alternative sources who are
not eyewitnesses to the alleged crime may be just as useful to a grand
jury investigation as a reporter's testimony.93
By permitting a court to compel a reporter to reveal confidential
information only when other sources are unavailable, the exhaustion re-
quirement attempts to avoid a first amendment confrontation. If alter-
native sources are reasonably identifiable and available, the grand jury
must take steps to subpoena them.94 Conversely, the exhaustion re-
quirement is satisfied when alternative sources are inaccessible or ques-
92 For a discussion of the investigatory powers and limits of the grand jury, see supra notes
62-68 and accompanying text.
93 For instance, a non-reporter who receives information from an eyewitness to a crime
will likely be as useful to a grand jury as a reporter who receives information from the same
eyewitness.
94 See, e.g., Burke, 700 F.2d at 77 (third-party witness to reporter's interview available as
alternative source); Zereli, 656 F.2d at 713 (Justice Department employees available as alter-
native source); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 638 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938
(1974) (alternative source unidentifiable, thus exhaustion requirement satisfied).
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tioned without success.9 5
A more difficult question arises when the number of potential alter-
native sources is so great that questioning them all is burdensome.
Courts have held that in civil proceedings, deposing even more than
fifty alternative sources is not an unreasonable burden.96 Because the
first amendment issues are the same in grand jury proceedings as in civil
proceedings, 9 7 a similar rule should extend to grand jury proceedings.
Third, the balancing test requires the prosecutor to show a compel-
ling and overriding interest in obtaining a newsgatherer's confidential
information. This requirement is in accord with the established doc-
trine that absent a compelling state interest, a first amendment right
may not be infringed.98 The most useful way of applying this test is to
ask whether the information sought goes to the heart of the claim. 99 In
a grand jury proceeding, a compelling interest would require that the
information be necessary or essential for the grand jury's determination
whether or not to indict. 00
95 See Trautman v. Dallas School Dist., 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1088 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
(reporter held in contempt for refusing to reveal confidential information after plaintiff satis-
fied exhaustion requirement); United Liquor v. Gard, 88 F.R.D. 123 (D. Ariz. 1980), appeal
dismissed, 685 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1982) (reporter compelled to reveal confidential information
after plaintiff satisfied exhaustion requirement).
96 See In re Roche, 448 U.S. 1312 (1980) (Brennan, J., in chambers) (sixty-five subpoenas
not unreasonable to satisfy exhaustion requirement); Zerelli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (sixty depositions not unreasonable to satisfy exhaustion requirement); Carey v. Hume,
492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. dimissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974) (sixty depositions not unrea-
sonable to satisfy exhaustion requirement). But see United States v. Steelhammer, 561 F.2d
539 (4th Cir. 1977) (reporter attending union rally compelled to testify notwithstanding avail-
ability of alternative sources).
97 Burke, 700 F.2d at 77.
98 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
99 Miller v. Transamerican Press Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1041 (1981); Car,, 492 F.2d at 636.
100 A number of courts in non-grand jury proceedings have ordered in camera inspection of
subpoenaed information. In some situations, it may be difficult for a court to determine
whether a party has a compelling interest in obtaining subpoenaed information unless the
court is able to examine that information. Although in camera inspection has a superficial
appeal, in camera production still compromises the first amendment rights of the press, particu-
larly if the court requires no preliminary showing of relevance and exhaustion of other
sources. On several occasions, Justice Marshall has noted that forced disclosure, even to a
judge for an in camera inspection, might well have a deleterious effect on the ability of the
press to gather news. See New York Times v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1331 (August 4, 1978)
(Marshall, J., in chambers); New York Times v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1304 (July 12, 1978)
(Marshall, J., in chambers).
United States v. Cuthbrtron highlighted one danger to the press posed by in camera inspec-
tion. In Cuthbertson, the trial court ordered CBS to submit tapes of interviews for an in camera
determination ofwhether the tapes contained material for impeachment. CBS complied with
the order. United States v. Cuthbertson II, 651 F.2d 189, 192 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1056 (1981). After the in camera inspection, the trial court concluded that the produced
materials would materially aid the defendants in the preparation of their case and ordered
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Courts should extend the Stewart balancing test to grand jury pro-
ceedings because the test is fair and easy to apply. Although the test
shields reporters from most grand jury subpoenas, the test is not so im-
pervious as to frustrate effective grand jury investigations of criminal
activity. If a grand jury requires a reporter's testimony to resolve an
investigation of a probable criminal violation, the grand jury can com-
pel the reporter's testimony.
In addition, the balancing test does not require a court to weigh
normative judgments regarding the public's interest in a case, the mag-
nitude of the chilling effect on first amendment rights, or the nature of
the crime the grand jury is investigating against the strength of the first
amendment claim. Rather, courts applying the balancing test need
consider only factors that involve the resolution of the grand jury's in-
vestigation. Of course, judging whether the requirements of relevance,
exhaustion of alternative sources, and necessity are met will not come
about through wholly objective analyses. Determining whether a re-
porter's confidential information will resolve a grand jury investigation,
however, should invite far more predictability and objectivity than a
judgment that attempts to measure the degree to which the disclosure of
a reporter's confidential information compromises the freedom of the
press. The three-part test strikes a balance between the important inter-
est of the prosecutor and the grand jury in pursuing criminal investiga-
tions on the one hand, and the media's constitutionally protected
interest in gathering and disseminating information on the other.
V. THE STATUTORY NEWSPERSON'S PRIVILEGE
Although the Supreme Court in Branwburg failed to resolve the issue
of the constitutional reporter's privilege,' 10 the Court made clear that
states may legislate their own newsperson's privilege, even in grand jury
proceedings. 102 This holding is consistent with the established doctrine
that states may provide stronger protections than those afforded by the
United States Constitution. 103 Indeed, state statutory testimonial privi-
CBS to produce the materials to the defendants before trial. Id. The trial court neglected,
however, to reapply the balancing test before releasing the exculpatory tapes. The Third
Circuit reversed the order in Cuthberlson IL Id.; see supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
101 See supra notes 24-56 and accompanying text.
102 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706:
There is also merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment limits, to
fashion their own standards in light of the conditions and problems with respect to the
relations between law enforcement officials and press in their own areas. It goes without
saying, of course, that we are powerless to bar state courts from responding in their own
way and construing their own constitutions so as to require a newsman's privilege, either
qualified or absolute.
103 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 441 U.S. 1 (1973).
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leges, or "shield laws," have existed for many years.10 4 At present,
twenty-six states have enacted shield laws. of various types. 0 5 Shield
laws vary greatly in the scope and qualifications of the newsperson's
privilege. Most of the statutes apply to all formal state proceedings, in-
cluding administrative hearings, trial proceedings, legislative committee
hearings, and grand jury proceedings. 106
Although shield laws in most states extend to grand jury proceed-
ings, shield laws do not mitigate the need to recognize the qualified first
amendment privilege in state grand jury proceedings. Because the first
amendment applies to the states, 0 7 the existence of a qualified first
amendment privilege that extends to grand jury proceedings also ap-
plies to the states. Yet, few shield laws provide newsgatherers with pro-
tection that equals or exceeds the constitutional privilege. Thus, in
virtually all states,,the statutory newsperson's privilege is an insufficient
substitute for the recognition of the constitutional privilege.
Four states have legislated an absolute newsperson's privilege. ' 08 In
these states, a grand jury cannot compel a reporter to reveal confidential
information that is obtained in newsgathering-related activities. Pre-
sumably, this absolute privilege applies even when a reporter observes
criminal activity. Despite its potentially unlimited protection, the abso-
lute privilege is in reality not nearly so far reaching. Only in New Jersey
104 Maryland eracted the first shield law in 1893. Law of April 2, 1886, ch. 249, 1886 Md.
Laws 437 (now codified as MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1980)).
105 ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1975); ALAsKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150-.220 (Supp. 1982); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (Repl. 1977); CAL. EviD.
CODE § 1070 (West 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-26 (1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, §§ 8-901 to -909 (1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 421.100 (Baldwin 1971); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-:1454 (West 1982); MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 9-112 (1980); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 767.5a (West 1982);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (West Supp. 1978); MONT. CODE ANN. § 93-601-2 (Supp.
1977); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 49.275, .385 (1981);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21.2 to .8 (West Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (1982);
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (Consol. 1981); N.D. CErrr. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.04 (Page Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West
1980); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 942 (Purdon 1982);
R.I. GEN. LAWs §§ 9-19.1-1 to .1-3 (Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980).
106 No shield law statute specifically excludes grand jury proceedings. No reported cases
have construed a shield law to deny the privilege in grand jury proceedings. Although one
Michigan court has construed its shield law to apply solely to grand jury proceedings, Michi-
gan v. Smith, 9 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1753 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1978), another Michigan court
has recognized the first amendment privilege, In re Photo Marketing Assoc. Int'l, 120 Mich.
App. 527, 327 N.W.2d 515 (1982).
107 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (the United States Supreme Court applied
the first amendment to the states through the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth
amendment).
108 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1982); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147 (1977);
NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21.1 to .8 (West Supp. 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.04
(Page Supp. 1982).
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has a court stated that the shield law affords an absolute privilege in all
proceedings absent a conflicting constitutional right. 10 9 Appellate
courts in Arizona, Nebraska, and Ohio have yet to consider the extent of
a shield law's protection in grand jury proceedings. 10 Consequently, a
reporter in these states has no assurance that courts will give a literal
interpretation to the shield law's language. 1
The remaining twenty-two states have a qualified statutory testi-
monial privilege. 1 2 Many of the shield laws afford newsgatherers less
protection than the qualified first amendment privilege. The qualified
first amendment privilege can be overcome only by a showing of rele-
109 Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176, 445 A.2d 376 (1982) ("New Jersey Shield
Law affords newspersons an absolute privilege not to disclose confidential sources and edito-
rial processes, absent any conflicting constitutional right"). Shield laws sometimes yield to
competing federal and state constitutional concerns. When criminal defendants subpoena a
newsgatherer to obtain confidential information, courts have surrendered the reporter's statu-
tory privilege to the defendant's sixth amendment rights to compulsory process and a fair
trial. United States v. Homer, 411 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (Pennsylvania shield law
not permitted to stand in the way when inquiry goes to heart of the matter in a criminal case
in federal court); Hammarley v. Super. Ct., 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979)
(statutory privilege must yield to defendant's sixth amendment right of compulsory process);
In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978) (statutory privilege
must yield to defendant's sixth amendment right of compulsory process); Ammerman v. Hub-
bard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978)
(New Mexico shield law conflicts with court established rule of evidence and thus violates the
separation of powers clause of the New Mexico Constitution); In re McAuley, 65 Ohio App.
2d 5, 408 N.E.2d 697 (1979) (requiring criminal defendant to prove that 1) the reporter had
information relevant to guilt or innocence; 2) the defendant had exhausted all other available
sources; 3) the defendant made an effort to obtain related, nonconfidential information from
reporter; and 4) the defendant had requested an in camera inspection of information).
110 No reported cases exist in Nebraska regarding any aspect of the shield law.
111 A Maricopa County Circuit Court judge has ruled that the Arizona shield law does not
extend to a reporter's personal observation of an alleged crime that a grand jury is investigat-
ing. In re O'Neill, No. 49 G.J. 440 (Ariz. Dist. Ct. Sept. 9, 1983).
112 Two states have shield laws that grant newsgatherers immunity from contempt cita-
tions rather than a privilege against disclosure. CAL- EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1983); N.Y.
Civ. RIGHTs LAW § 79-h (Consol. 1981). Thus, courts may impose other sanctions on the
media in civil cases where the reporter is a party. See KSDO v. Superior Court of Riverside
County, 136 Cal. App. 3d 383, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1982) (court sanctions under California
shield law include striking reporter's defense or entering default judgment); Rancho ]a Costa
v. Penthouse, 6 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1540 (1980), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 450 U.S.
902 (1981) (court sanctions under California shield law may include preclusion of a reporter's
defense); Oak Beach Inn v. Babylon Beacon, 62 N.Y.2d 158, 476 N.Y.S.2d 269 (1984) (court
sanctions under New York shield law should be no more drastic than necessary to protect
legitimate interests of the press).
Some states allow the privilege to be overcome upon the satisfaction of certain elements
similar to those proposed by Justice Stewart in his Brawzburg dissent. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 595.021-.025 (West Supp. 1978) (showing of relevance, exhaustion of alternative sources,
and necessity required); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 1980) (same showing, with
respect to unpublished information only); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 9-19.1-1 to .1-3 (Supp. 1982)
(privilege may be overcome only if disclosure is necessary for the criminal prosecution of a
specific felony or to prevent a threat to human life); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980)
(showing of relevance, exhaustion of alternative sources, and necessity required).
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vance, exhaustion of alternative sources, and necessity. 113 By contrast,
the shield laws in four states may be overcome simply by a court's deter-
mination that justice or policy require the privilege to yield. 14
The Delaware and Illinois shield laws enumerate several factors
that courts may consider in determining whether the privilege must
yield. 1" 5 These statutes, however, do not assign a burden of proof and
are silent as to the weight a court should give each factor. Moreover,
Delaware and Illinois courts are not required to consider the statutory
factors in every case.11 6
Alaska, Arkansas, and Kentucky have statutory privileges that ap-
ply only when the information obtained by a source is published or
113 See supra note 91.
114 ALAsKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150-.220 (Supp. 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 645:1451-:1454
(West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976).
115 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1974) (factors include relevance, exhaustion of
alternative sources, the circumstances in which newsgatherer obtained the information, and
effect of disclosure on newsgathering process); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 8-901 to -909
(1983) (required factors include finding that secrecy of information is nonessential and ex-
haustion of alternative sources). A number of states restrict or disallow the privilege when a
media defendant claims the privilege in a defamation action. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 8-
901 to 8-909 (1983) (privilege not available to media defendants in defamation actions); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451- :1454 (West 1982) (burden of proof on reporter with regard to
good faith); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (West Supp. 1978) (privilege overcome by
showing of relevancy and exhaustion of sources); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West
1980) (privilege disallowed in defamation actions when media defendant asserts defense based
on privileged information); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1979) (same); R.I. GEN. LAws
§§ 9-19.1-1 to .1-3 (Supp. 1982) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980) (same). See also
Greenberg v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 69 A.D.2d 693, 419 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1979) (inter-
preting New York shield law to protect confidential sources as long as such sources are not
relied on as evidence of verification).
A statute also may refuse to allow a newsperson to shield the source of the details of
secret proceedings. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to .1-3 (Supp. 1982) (restriction includes
grand jury proceedings).
In some instances, narrow judicial interpretation has limited the scope and effect of
shield laws. For example, several courts have strictly construed the definition of "source" to
exclude persons engaged in illegal activity observed by a reporter. See Branzburg v. Pound,
461 S.W.2d 245 (Ky. 1970), aJ'd sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); accord
Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149, aJ'd, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212, cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1972); In re Ziegler, 550 F. Supp. 530 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); Solargen Elec.
Motor Car Corp. v. American Motors Corp., 506 F. Supp. 546 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Dan, 80
Misc. 2d 399, N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1975). But see Beach v. Shanley, 62 N.Y.2d 241, 465
N.E.2d 304, 476 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1984) (New York shield law does not except situations where
the reporter observes a criminal act).
This narrow definition of "source" parallels the Branzburg holding that no first amend-
ment privilege will protect a reporter's source when the reporter has personally seen the
source engage in criminal conduct. But see Note, Sixth Amendment Limitations on the Newsperson's
Privilege, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 361, 391 (1982) (courts should protect a promise of confidentiality
when informants allow reporters to observe them perform criminal acts).
116 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 8-901 to -909
(1983).
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broadcast. 1 7 In-these states, then, the privilege depends in large part on
the editorial judgments of the journalist's editors. A grand jury may
compel a reporter to reveal a source simply because the reporter's story
was never printed or aired. Applying the shield law only to published or
broadcast stories does not offer reporters the same investigative opportu-
nity granted by the first amendment privilege because reporters, unable
to guarantee publication or broadcast of their stories, cannot assure
their sources that a newsperson's qualified privilege protects the sources'
disclosures. 1 8
Furthermore, although most federal courts have recognized that
the newsperson's first amendment privilege extends to unpublished in-
formation," 19 eleven states restrict their shield laws to sources alone. 120
Consequently, a significant body of information under the purview of
the first amendment testimonial privilege, including outtakes, reporter's
notes, documents, photographs, and tape recordings, is outside the scope
and the protection of state shield law statutes. 121 Similarly, the Nevada
shield law's stipulation that a reporter waives the privilege upon the
disclosure of part of a confidential matter,122 and the New York shield
117 ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150-.220 (Supp. 1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (Repl.
1977); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42 1.100 (Baldwin 1971).
11 8 The first amendment privilege, by contrast, protects a newsgatherer's confidential in-
formation regardless of whether the newsgatherer's story was published or aired.
119 See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Cuthbert-
son, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981); In reConsumers Union, 495
F. Supp. 582, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("discovery [of unpublished information] would represent
a substantial intrusion on fact gathering and editorial privacy which are significant aspects of
a free press"); Altemose Constr. Co. v. Building and Constr. Trades Council, 443 F. Supp.
489, 491 (E.D. Pa. 1977) ("privilege can even apply when . . . a portion of the withheld
writing [is] not confidential"); Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (com-
pelled production of a reporter's resource materials is equally as invidious as the compelled
disclosure of his confidential informants).
120 ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150-220 (Supp. 1982); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (Repl. 1977); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-3-5-1 (Burns 1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 8-901 to -909 (1983); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 421.100 (Baldwin 1971); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-:1454 (West 1982); MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.04 (Page
Supp. 1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5942 (Purdon 1982). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has extended the Pennsylvania shield law to unpublished information although, on its
face, the shield law protects only sources. See In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
121 See, e.g., Williams v. American Broadcasting Co., 96 F.R.D. 658 (W.D. Ark. 1983)
(shield law does not protect outtakes that would not reveal a source).
122 NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 49.275, .385 (1981). Several state courts also have found a waiver
of the privilege when reporters disclose a portion of their confidential information. See In re
Dan, 80 Misc. 2d 399, 363 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1975); People v. Wolf, 69 Misc. 2d 256, 329
N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. 1972), af'd, 39 A.D.2d 864, 333 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1972). But see Lal v.
Columbia Broadcast System, 551 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. Pa. 1982), afd, 726 F.2d 97 (3d Cir.
1984) (under Pennsylvania shield law, disclosure of informant does not waive privilege re-
garding informant's statements); Saxton v. Arkansas Gazette, 569 S.W.2d 115 (Ark. 1978)
(disclosure of sources does not waive privilege); People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein, 89 Ill. 2d
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law's requirement of confidentiality between reporters and their
sources 2 3 do not parallel first amendment privilege qualifications. 24
The majority of states that statutorily recognize the newsperson's
privilege, therefore, have not enacted shield laws that replace the consti-
tutional privilege. 125 Most often, statutory testimonial privileges confer
to journalists a less dependable and less predictable shield than the first
amendment privilege. Consequently, the recognition of a qualified first
amendment privilege in state grand jury proceedings is necessary be-
cause state shield laws have failed to provide a privilege that reflects and
protects newsgatherers' constitutionally guaranteed interests.
VI. STATES WITHOUT SHIELD LAWS
Just as the qualified first amendment newsperson's privilege must
167, 429 N.E.2d 483 (1981) (disclosure of sources does not waive privilege); Maressa v. New
Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176, 445 A.2d 376 (1982) (waiver operates only as to specific materi-
als knowingly and voluntarily disclosed).
123 See, e.g., Solargen Elec. Motor Car Corp. v. American Motors Corp., 506 F. Supp. 546
(N.D.N.Y. 1981); New York v. Korkala, 121 Misc. 2d 291, 467 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1983),
afd as modified, 99 A.D.2d 161, 472 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1984); Andrews v. Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d
410,400 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1977); People v. Dupree, 88 Misc. 2d 791, 388 N.Y.S.2d 1000
(Sup. Ct. 1976). But see Wilkins v. Kalla, 118 Misc. 2d 34, 459 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1983)
(interpreting 1981 amendments to shield law as conferring privilege whether or not informa-
tion obtained was confidential); New York v. lannoccone, 112 Misc. 2d 1057, 447 N.Y.S.2d
996 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (interpreting 1981 amendments to shield law as conferring privilege
whether or not information obtained was confidential).
124 Most federal courts have concluded that the first amendment privilege does not depend
on any express or implied agreement of confidentiality between reporters and their sources.
See United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983) (privilege applicable regardless of
whether information is confidentially obtained); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139
(3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981) (privilege applicable even though no confi-
dential sources were involved and the government had obtained waivers from all sources
permitting disclosure of their statements); Maughan v. NL Indus., 524 F. Supp. 93 (D.D.C.
1981) (subpoena quashed even though "no confidential source or confidential information
was involved in the newsgathering activities in question"); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Comm'n v. N.F.L., 89 F.R.D. 489 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (privilege is "broader" than the mere
protection of confidential sources); Gulliver's Periodicals, Ltd. v. Chas. Levy Circulating Co.,
455 F. Supp. 1197, 1203 (N.D. Ill. 1978) ("the mere fact that the source of an article is known
is irrelevant to the disposition of a claim that the underlying materials need not be pro-
duced"); Altemose Constr. Co. v. Building and Constr. Trades Council, 443 F. Supp. 489,
491 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (privilege available where "the news source and, perhaps, a portion of the
withheld [information], are not confidential").
Further, federal courts have held that the first amendment privilege applies even when a
reporter is subpoenaed to testify about published information and revealed sources. See
United States v. Blanton, 534 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp.
1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
125 At least two courts in states with shield laws have rejected the first amendment privi-
lege. See In re Bridge, 120 NJ. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), cerl. denied, 62
N.J. 80, 229 A.2d 78 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973); Andrews v. Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d
410, 400 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1977). But see CBA Elec. v. Ellenberg, 10 MEDIA L. REP.
(BNA) 1095 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1983).
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extend to states with shield laws, afortiori the privilege must extend to
states that do not have shield laws. In twenty-four states, reporters have
no statutory privilege. 126 Courts in seven of these non-shield law states
have recognized the first amendment privilege, 127 while courts in three
of the states have recognized the privilege based on other considera-
tions. 128 The recognition and acceptance of the first amendment news-
person's privilege in the remaining fourteen non-shield law states is
overdue. Once recognized, all non-shield law states, along with federal
jurisdictions, should extend the privilege to grand jury proceedings.
Of the seven non-shield law states that have recognized the first
amendment privilege, only Texas has extended the privilege to grand
jury proceedings. In In re Grand Jug Subpoena,'29 a Texas district court
quashed a grand jury subpoena of a televison reporter's outtakes. The
court held that although the press has no absolute constitutional privi-
lege against giving testimony before a grand jury, "disclosure [before a
grand jury] should not be compelled in the absence of a concern so com-
pelling as to override the rights of freedom of speech and press."' 30 The
remaining six states have limited their recognition of the constitutional
privilege to criminal trial proceedings. In State v. St. Peter, for instance,
the Vermont Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant could com-
pel a reporter's testimony only if the defendant could demonstrate that
the information was relevant and material to guilt or innocence and
126 Colo.; Conn.; Fla.; Ga.; Hawaii; Idaho; Iowa; Kan.; Me.; Mass.; Miss.; Mo.; N.H.; N.C.;
S.C.; S.D.; Tex.; Utah; Vt.; Va.; Wash.; W. Va.; Wis.; Wyo.
127 Gadsden County Times, Inc. v. Home, 426 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(privilege recognized in criminal and civil proceedings); In re Pennington, 224 Kan. 573, 581
P.2d 812 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979) (privilege recognized in criminal proceeding);
North Carolina v. Hagaman, 9 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2525 (N.C. Dist. Ct. 1983) (privilege
recognized in criminal and civil proceedings); Dallas Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Mouer, 533 S.W.2d
70 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (privilege recognized in civil proceeding); State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt.
226, 315 A.2d 254 (1974) (privilege recognized in criminal proceeding); Brown v. Common-
wealth, 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974) (privilege recognized in
criminal proceeding); Zelenka v. Wisconsin, 83 Wis. 2d 601, 266 N.W.2d 279 (1978) (privilege
recognized in criminal proceeding).
Three non-shield law states have considered the first amendment privilege and rejected
it. See In re Goodfader's Appeal, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961); Sierra Life Ins. Co. v.
Magic Valley Newspapers, Inc., 101 Idaho 795, 623 P.2d 103 (1980); Commonwealth v. Cor-
setti, 387 Mass. 1, 438 N.E.2d 805 (1982).
128 State v. Siel, 122 N.H. 254,444 A.2d 499 (1982) (privilege based in part on New Hamp-
shire Constitution); Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 97 Wash. 2d 148, 641 P.2d 1180
(1982) (privilege based on common law); Zelenka v. Wisconsin, 83 Wis. 2d 601, 266 N.W.2d
279 (1978) (privilege based in part on Wisconsin Constitution).
129 5 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1153 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 1979).
130 Id Texas has also recognized the first amendment privilege in civil proceedings, Traut-
man v. Dallas School Dist., 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1088 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Dallas Oil and
Gas, Inc. v. Mouer, 533 S.W.2d (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1976), and in criminal trial proceedings,
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 5 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1153 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 1979).
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that no other adequate available source existed.1 3 1
Three states have found alternative means for recognizing the
newsperson's privilege. The Washington Supreme Court created a qual-
ified newsperson's privilege based on the court's authority to re-evaluate
the common law.132 Both the Wisconsin1 33 and New Hampshire
Supreme Courts1 34 have relied in part on state constitutional provisions
to create a newsperson's privilege. In none of these cases, however, is it
clear that the privilege extends to grand jury proceedings.
Because the first amendment privilege applies to the states, state
recognition of the first amendment privilege is mandatory. Despite the
universal recognition of the first amendment newsperson's privilege in
federal jurisdictions, however, recognition of the first amendment privi-
lege in non-shield law states has proceeded as if such recognition were
optional. In the states that have recognized the first amendment privi-
lege, state courts, like their federal counterparts, have been reluctant to
extend the privilege to grand jury proceedings. As in federal jurisdic-
tions, such reluctance is inconsistent with the recognition of the privilege
in criminal trial proceedings.1 35
A state court's reasons for refusing to extend the privilege to grand
131 132 Vt. 266, 271, 315 A.2d 254, 256 (1974).
In Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 757, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431 (1974), the Virginia
Supreme Court held that the privilege would yield "only when the defendant's need is essen-
tial to a fair trial." The court limited this test to situations when the defendant believes the
information is material to proof of an element of the crime or an asserted defense. Id
The Kansas Supreme Court, in In re Pennington, 224 Kan. 573, 577, 581 P.2d 812, 815
(1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979), ordered disclosure in criminal cases where the re-
porter's information is material to prove an element of the offense, to prove a defense asserted
by the defendant, to reduce the classification of the offense charged, or to mitigate or lessen
the imposed sentence.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Zelenka v. Wisconsin, 83 Wis. 2d 601, 266 N.W.2d
279 (1978), recognized the first amendment privilege in criminal proceedings and applied a
balancing test almost identical to the test applied by Justice Stewart.
132 Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 97 Wash. 2d 148, 641 P.2d 1180 (1982). The Wash-
ington Supreme Court declined to follow an intermediate court's recognition of the first
amendment privilege, stating that "when we can decide a case on other than constitutional
grounds, we should do it." Id. at 152, 641 P.2d 1182. Because Senear was a libel case, the
privilege created is limited to civil actions, but the court left open whether the privilege would
extend to criminal cases. A party attempting to obtain a newsgatherer's confidential informa-
tion may defeat the privilege by a showing of nonfrivolousness, necessity, and exhaustion of
alternative sources. In addition, a court is to consider "how the reporter received the infor-
mation and whether the source has [a] reasonable expectation of confidentiality." Id. at 156,
641 P.2d at 1184.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has noted its "willingness" to consider a
common law privilege in future cases, In re Roche, 381 Mass. 624, 411 N.E.2d 466 (1980), but
again recently declined to recognize such a privilege. Commonwealth v. Corsetti, 387 Mass.
1, 438 N.E.2d 805 (1982).
133 Zelenka v. Wisconsin, 83 Wis. 2d 601, 266 N.W.2d 279 (1978).
134 State v. Siel, 122 N.H. 254, 444 A.2d 499 (1982).
135 See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
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jury proceedings are weakened further by the Supreme Court's refusal
to apply the fifth amendment grand jury requirement to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.13 6 Be-
cause a grand jury is constitutionally mandated for criminal indictments
in federal courts but is not constitutionally required for state criminal
indictments, the first amendment privilege should command more
weight when balanced against a state-rather than a federal-grand
jury's attempt to subpoena a reporter's confidential information.
Once state courts accept and extend the first amendment privilege
to grand jury proceedings, several strong arguments exist for adopting
the three-part Stewart test. First, the utilization of the identical test in
all proceedings-criminal, civil, and grand jury, federal and state-
guarantees all parties consistent and predictable outcomes when new-
sgatherers assert the qualified first amendment privilege. In grand jury
proceedings, prosecutors will know in advance that to overcome the
privilege, they must show relevancy, exhaustion of alternative sources,
and necessity. The newsgatherer is assured that the identical first
amendment privilege adheres regardless of the forum.
Second, the three-part test is understandable and easy to apply.1 3 7
Lastly, the three-part test is fair. Although the test shields reporters
from most grand jury subpoenas, the test is not so strict as to frustrate
effective grand jury investigations of criminal activity. Thus, the grand
jury's interest in investigating crime is appropriately balanced against
the media's first amendment right to gather information.
VII. CONCLUSION
The free flow of information to the public is the cornerstone of a
free society. Frustrating a newsperson's ability to gather the news jeop-
ardizes the public's right to know. For this reason, the first amendment
accords to journalists special protection in the form of a qualified privi-
lege. When the grand jury's investigation of a probable criminal offense
collides with first amendment rights, the government has the burden of
establishing that its interests are legitimate and compelling, and that the
infringement on first amendment rights is no greater than is essential to
vindicate its task of investigating a probable criminal offense.
The state and federal jurisdictions that currently recognize a news-
person's privilege do not recognize the same privilege. Federal courts
have overwhelmingly accepted a first amendment or federal common
law privilege, but have refused or neglected to extend it to grand jury
proceedings. State shield laws statutorily create and apply the privilege
136 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
137 See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
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to grand jury proceedings, but the protection conferred by the statutory
privileges often falls below that guaranteed by the first amendment priv-
ilege. A weakened newsperson's privilege also exists in states that have
created the privilege from state common law or from state constitutional
provisions. It is not clear, however, that even these state common law or
state constitutional law privileges extend to grand jury proceedings.
Fourteen states do not recognize a reporter's privilege in any form.
The reporter's first amendment privilege is a constitutionally de-
rived right, albeit a qualified right, that deserves judicial acceptance. In
criminal trial proceedings, where a defendant's sixth amendment right
to compulsory process competes with a newsgatherer's refusal to reveal
confidential information, courts have recognized the qualified first
amendment privilege. A grand jury, on the other hand, does not have a
constitutional right to subpoena information, and yet courts have re-
fused to extend the qualified first amendment privilege to the grand jury
room. Because the first amendment privilege extends to criminal trial
proceedings, the qualified first amendment privilege should extend to
grand jury proceedings as well. Courts should address and correct the
inconsistency of recognizing a qualified first amendment privilege in
criminal trial proceedings but not in grand jury proceedings. The first
amendment requires no less.
-DOUGLAS H. FRAZER
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